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Abstract
London is being successfully regenerated at present, yet poverty and
social exclusion are increasing. The paradox is explained in part by the
openness of the London economy and the lack of basic skills of a
substantial minority of the population. The Government’s policies for
tackling social exclusion are undermined by conflating the concept of
social exclusion with the discredited terminology of the “urban
underclass”. To be effective, policy needs to be less economically
conservative, and more focused on piecemeal reforms.
1. Introduction
If you look at the web-site set up by the New Millennium Experience
Company (www.mx2000.co.uk) you will find, among other things, a
picture and video gallery. One of the most striking pictures is a view taken
from a point just east of the site of the Millennium Dome. In the
foreground, a computer-generated image of the completed Dome has
been seamlessly inserted onto the current construction site; in the middle
distance there is the now familiar London landmark of Canary Wharf;
beyond there are the meanders of the Thames which enclose in their
apparently gentle loops, the heart of one of the world’s few true global
cities.
It is a stunning image, and brings home the historical audacity of
contemporary attempts, through the Docklands investment, the
Millennium site, and perhaps, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, to reverse
the centuries-old westward growth of London.
But the architecture of the Dome (or at least the architecture of the
virtual Dome to which the Internet gives us access) suggests another
image – that of a huge and billowing parachute which has been safely
landed at the very tip of a forgotten and unloved peninsula of the Thames.
I want to start from this image, because I believe it suggests an approach
to urban regeneration, and to the wider issue of social exclusion, which is
becoming increasingly dominant in government. This approach is
fundamentally wrong, and if it continues to inform policy will seriously
weaken the attempt of this Government to tackle poverty and social
exclusion.
Let me set the scene. After a long period of conservative
government, and government neglect of issues of poverty and inequality,
an incoming government under a dynamic, charismatic young leader puts
these issues at the top of the agenda. But this leadership is also concerned
about re-election, and the need to carry with it the broad mass of the
population, who are not poor. It wishes to get away from the ‘government
knows best’ approach, and emphasises community participation. A
broadly sympathetic commentator writes:
“There [are] three key elements to community action…It
[should] operate at the ground level; community action
agencies [should] be located in poor neighborhoods, not
downtown office buildings. It [should] co-ordinate a wide
variety of social services in a single location so that poor
people wouldn’t have to spend half their lives shuttling
2between the welfare office and the public housing office and
the job placement office. Finally, it [should] plan its activities
based on what the poor people actually [want] from
government, rather than what bureaucrats in [the capital]
thought they needed.”
A key element in the strategy is welfare reform, and members of the
government proselytise for the new approach under the slogan that
welfare benefits should be “a hand up, not a handout”.
This is a familiar scenario to all those who have followed the actions
of New Labour in its first 10 months in office. Except that this is neither
New Labour under Blair in 1998, nor even New Democrats under Clinton
in 1992. It is the New Frontier under John Kennedy in 1963, and the quote
above (slightly adapted) is from Nicholas Lemann’s perceptive book
about race and poverty in America, “The Promised Land”.
It is impossible to read the sections of the book which deal with the
evolution of the policy that became the ‘War on Poverty’ without a strong
sense of déjà vu. Lemann writes:
“Most economists, and economics-oriented liberals, believed
that the real cure for poverty was income redistribution, but
that was not an option…because Lyndon Johnson was
unalterably opposed to it…on Johnson’s orders, Lester
Thurow, then a junior member of the staff of the Council of
Economic Advisers, was given the task of going through the
Economic Report of the President removing anything that
could be construed as a reference to putting cash in the hands
of poor people. There had to be programs to end poverty.”
It is also instructive to note how dissenters were dealt with at that time.
Elizabeth Wickenden wrote to President Johnson’s deputy Chief of Staff
on Jan 4th 1964:
“The problems of poverty are only in limited instances
localised in character. They are for the most part widely
distributed, related to economic and social factors that operate
nationwide, and would require more than local action for
solution.”
In my view, as a two-sentence analysis, this is just about right, and equally
relevant to a discussion of social exclusion in Britain in 1998, as it was to a
discussion of poverty in the US in 1964. But it did not go down well then,
just as it does not go down well now. Lemann writes that Wickenden
received only a brief, patronising note from the deputy’s deputy.
3Under the War on Poverty in the US in the 1960s, area based
initiatives proliferated. A proposal to have demonstration projects in 6 or
perhaps 10 cities became 250 in the first year of operation and then a
thousand cities by 1967. There are echoes here too: currently in England,
we have more than 500 regeneration schemes nationally supported by the
Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund, as well as 31 City Challenge
companies and several Urban Development Corporations reaching the
end of their lives.  On the way are Health Action Zones, Education Action
Zones and Employment Action Zones.
I am not opposing area-focused programmes – quite the reverse. My
own research on urban regeneration and on employability initiatives has
convinced me that programmes work best when they are based on
genuine partnerships, on the commitment at all levels of the private and
public sector partners, and on a clear understanding of the local
environment. But local initiatives cannot alone provide solutions to
problems whose causes are national or even international. Local initiatives
must be supported by the right kind of policies at regional and national
level. There is also a limited role for the European Union, but the influence
of European institutions, despite the rhetoric, is peripheral. It will remain
so, until and unless we all decide we want a proper Federal Europe with a
Federal government that taxes and spends.
The various Zones and other initiatives will, to a limited degree,
focus resources on the worst-off areas, and this is to be welcomed.
Moreover, the Prime Minister has spoken about the need to improve co-
ordination between government departments and between agencies – he
has said that “joined up problems demand joined up solutions”. But they
also need some joined up thinking, and this means going back to some
basics and thinking hard about what regeneration and exclusion really
mean. It will also mean some hard choices for the Government –that is,
real hard choices, not the PR version – about which policies to pursue.
What I am going to do in this lecture is: first, look at the links between
regeneration and inequality in London; secondly, examine what is meant
by ‘social exclusion’; and thirdly discuss the policy agenda.
2. London and regeneration
London is, as we all know, booming. Around the LSE where I work, new
restaurants and bars open almost every week. House prices in London
rose sharply last year, drawing comparisons with the boom-and-bust
1980s. London teems not only with students and tourists, but also with
thousands of job seekers too. These range from young people from
4literally all over the world finding a niche in London’s expanding formal
and informal service economy to unemployed Parisian bankers and
lawyers relocating to London who put up with the overcrowded Tube and
plastic-wrapped cheese. Indeed early in 1998, more than a quarter of a
million rural dwellers came to London just to enjoy a Sunday afternoon
walk from Trafalgar Square to Hyde Park – a simple pleasure so many of
us take for granted.
In the run-up to the Millennium, London is also being ‘regenerated’.
A word that includes large flagship projects such as the Dome, the new
Wembley Stadium, a new bridge across the Thames, the redevelopment of
the South Bank, the opening up to street life of key central London
Squares, through continuing major investments in areas such as the Royal
Docks, Stratford, Paddington and Kings Cross, to literally hundreds of
local and community-based partnerships.
This impetus for urban revitalisation has been given another spin by
the recent concern about increased urban sprawl to accommodate the
projected increase in the number of households. All sorts of bodies and
individuals, who previously had only marginal interest at best in urban
issues, have declared themselves to be strongly in favour of ‘brownfield’
development. By this, they mean the re-use of contaminated, derelict and
ex-industrial sites within cities for new housing, in order to stop
encroachment on the countryside. But if the town cannot go to the
countryside, then the countryside must come to the town, so brownfield
developments are to be villages, or at least “urban villages”.  The West
Silvertown Urban Village is already being built in the Docklands, and we
are soon to have a Millennium Village on the Greenwich Peninsula next to
the Dome.
We have been here before. In the 1980s, the London economy
boomed. The decades-old decline in central London’s employment and
population was halted and even reversed. Skill shortages emerged in key
industries and the infrastructure, particularly transport, groaned under
the strain. But the effect on unemployment particularly in the most
disadvantaged parts of the city, inner London and east London was
negligible. The increased demand for labour was met not by drawing on
the pool of unemployed labour in London, but rather by attracting more
commuters into central London from all over the South-East.
Despite the boom, inequality and social exclusion increased in
London (London Research Centre, 1996). The position of those at the
bottom of the earnings ladder worsened. In 1979, the bottom 10% of male
earners earned 64% of median earnings, but this had fallen to 54% by the
1990s. The number of adult residents in receipt of income support rose
5from just over 500,000 in 1989 (11%) to almost 1 million in 1994 (17%).
Including partners and children, over 1.5 million Londoners – residents of
a true global metropolis and living in supposedly the “coolest city on the
planet” – rely upon Income Support to feed and clothe themselves.
In 1991, deaths in the most deprived neighbourhoods in London
were some 25% higher than expected (on standardised national mortality
rates) while in the most affluent areas, deaths were 20% lower than
expected. Violent crime increased by 130% between 1981 and 1993.
In 1997, the unemployment rate in London, on the ILO Labour Force
Survey definition stood at 9.6% – this is higher than the North-East region,
the North-West region and Northern Ireland. Only Merseyside has a
higher unemployment rate. Unemployment among some groups,
particularly young black men is far higher.
In short, London has a dynamic and successful economy, yet
hundreds of thousands of Londoners are unemployed. The key to this
paradox is the openness of the economy. London employers’ demand for
labour can be met by drawing on the national and international labour
market at the top end; drawing on commuters in the middle skill range,
while low-skill jobs are often filled by foreign workers, who now account
for 30% or so of jobs in catering, cleaning and domestic services.
A recent study by the Association of London Government study
found that
“there is a very weak connection between local economic
performance and the incidence of unemployment, even at the
Greater London level. For smaller areas within London, this is
even more true; spatial variations in unemployment rates
essentially reflect the residential distribution of those groups
in the weakest competitive position”
(Association of London Government, 1998)
Moreover, the relative position of these workers deteriorates over time,
leading to entrenched problems of social exclusion:
“There seems to be a progressive marginalisation, so long as
high unemployment persists, of those groups of workers in
the weakest competitive positions – who are highly
concentrated in a few locations within the region.”
(Association of London Government, 1998)
In other words, the core reason why unemployment in some
neighbourhoods in London is much higher than the national average is
that these areas contain relatively high proportions of households with
6those characteristics that are associated with unemployment. By putting
the issue in this way I do not mean to imply that individuals are to blame
for their own unemployment. I mean that in a competitive, open economy,
those individuals that have the least competitive attributes will find it
most difficult to gain access to jobs.
Research on local labour markets in London supports this view. For
example, in West London, demand from employers for labour is
concentrated at the level of NVQ3 and above, while the local supply
shows predominance at level NVQ2 and below. Some experts believe that
by 2006, the entry-level requirement for the West London labour market
will be NVQ4, that is, a university degree or its vocational equivalent. This
leads to the phenomenon of high-skill workers commuting into the area
and excluded and unemployed local residents.
Despite nearly 24,000 unemployed people in West London, 50% of
all vacancies remained unfilled at the end of the first quarter 1997. For
every unfilled vacancy at the end of April 1997, there were four applicants
who could not secure that job. This includes 1,600 jobs requiring minimal
or no skills that remained unfilled despite 4,300 applicants. West London
Training and Enterprise Council commented that
“Applicants just do not possess the required skills, experience
and, more importantly, attitude…The [1997 Workforce]
Survey shows that, worryingly, those most in need of
education and training, i.e. those with no qualifications, are
the people least likely to be considering any future education
or training.”
Clearly, these are issues of labour market mismatch. Many
unemployed residents in London do not possess the characteristics in
terms of skills, education and attitudes, which employers are looking for. I
shall return later to this issue of employability. The main point I want to
make here is that the solution to high unemployment in deprived areas
cannot be found simply by looking at these areas alone. We must look at
the connection or lack of connection between areas of concentrated
poverty and the rest of the economy. Those living in poor areas are not
excluded by globalisation. It would be more accurate to say they are
excluded from globalisation.
3. Social exclusion
This used to be an obscure term associated mainly with French academic
sociologists and worthy if impenetrable European Commission
7documents on Doing Good. But the concept of social exclusion has moved
to centre stage in British policy-making with remarkable speed. In doing
so, its lack of precise meaning has been an asset rather than a liability,
much as it was in the rapid ascent of the term ‘underclass’ several years
ago. But in trying to understand the causes of problems, and to devise
effective policy, this lack of precision is more than a liability – it is
catastrophic.
The government, or at least its leadership, appears to have few
worries about what the precise meaning of such terms. In his speech in
Southwark on 2 June 1997, just one month after the election, the Prime
Minister said there was a case in terms of both morality and enlightened
self-interest to “tackle what we all know exists – an underclass of people
cut off from society’s mainstream, without any sense of shared purpose.”
In another speech in December, launching the Social Exclusion Unit, he
argued
“Social exclusion is about income but it is about more. It is
about prospects and networks and life-chances. It’s a very
modern problem, and more harmful to the individual, more
damaging to self-esteem for society as a whole, more likely to
be passed down from generation to generation, than material
poverty.”
Speaking to the Fabian Society in August 1997, Peter Mandelson, the
Minister without Portfolio went further:
“There are 3 million people living in the worst 1,300 housing
estates expressing multiple deprivation, rising poverty,
unemployment, educational failure and crime. Behind these
statistics…are people who have lost hope trapped in fatalism.
They are today’s and tomorrow’s underclass, shut out from
society.”
In the same speech, Mr. Mandelson stated baldly “Our vision is to end
social exclusion. The task…will not be easy. But it is essential for the
government’s success.”
The imagery drawn on by both Blair and Mandelson is that of the
“urban underclass”, a powerful image much represented in the media.
This underclass, “shut out” or “cut off” from society is what “we all
know” exists. But this is precisely where we need some joined-up
thinking.  In fact, as a way of understanding the set of problems that
confronts us, the concept of the “underclass” is, to borrow a phrase from
8the physicists  “not even wrong”. As description it is inaccurate, as
analysis worse than useless, and as a guide to policy positively harmful.
The term “underclass” was imported from the United States in the
early 1980s. The two leading American scholars of the problems of
concentrated poverty and joblessness are Christopher Jencks and William
Julius Wilson. Neither of these scholars has any use for the term in the
sense implied by the above quotes, i.e. a separate class of people cut off
from the mainstream.
In a key article, Jencks (1991) showed that the debate about the
‘urban underclass’ in the U.S. conflated a number of separate policy
issues. Some of these problems were getting worse – male joblessness and
unwed parenthood. Some had stopped getting worse – welfare
dependency and violence. Some were getting better – the numbers of
high-school dropouts and reading and maths skills. Some had stopped
getting better – teenage parenthood and the numbers in poverty, which
fell 1940-70, but then did not change much after 1970. Few people fit the
‘middle-class’ or ‘underclass’ label exactly. Jencks argued that we do not
need ‘metasolutions’ to a ‘metaproblem’, but rather piecemeal reform,
changing institutions and attitudes in hundreds of small ways.
William Julius Wilson has moved away from the use of the term
‘underclass’, preferring instead the phrase ‘ghetto poor’. Furthermore, as
Wilson’s detailed and painstaking research in Chicago has shown, there is
no evidence that the urban poor embrace a set of moral values at odds
with the wider society:
“Our research reveals that the beliefs of inner-city residents
bear little resemblance to the blanket media reports asserting
that values have plummeted in impoverished inner-city
neighborhoods of that people in the inner city have an entirely
different value system. What is so striking is that despite the
overwhelming joblessness and poverty, black residents in
inner-city ghetto neighborhoods actually verbally endorse,
rather than undermine, the basic American values concerning
individual initiative.”
(Wilson, 1996: 179)
British research findings are similar. Lydia Morris, for example,
interviewed three groups of married couple households in North-east
England, divided into 3 groups: those where the man was long-term
unemployed, those where the man was in stable employment, and those
where the man was in less secure employment. She concluded:
9“there is no direct evidence in my study of a distinctive culture
of the ‘underclass’. There are differences of a kind which will
add to the already disadvantaged position of the unemployed,
but not which separate them off as having a fundamentally
different style of living.”
(Morris, 1993: 410)
‘Underclass’ as a term of analysis rightly no longer claims any intellectual
respect.
Social exclusion has considerably more potential as an explanatory
concept. As Atkinson (1998) argues, social exclusion can be distinguished
both from poverty and from unemployment, although all three concepts
are related. In seeking to discern a clearer definition of social exclusion in
the current debate, Atkinson emphasises three features, which he terms
relativity, agency and dynamics.
By relativity, he means that the concept implies looking not just at
the circumstances of individuals but also their relationship to others:
“People become excluded because of events elsewhere in society”
(Atkinson, 1998: 7). Indeed, social exclusion may perhaps be thought of as
a property of groups rather than individuals: “social exclusion often
manifests itself in terms of communities rather than individuals, an
illustration being the use by financial institutions of street postcodes for
purposes of credit rating.”
Secondly, the term social exclusion “implies an act, with an agent or
agents”. If someone is excluded, there is someone else – an individual, a
group of people, an institution or a market – who does the excluding. This
brings the concept of power into the discussion, although Atkinson does
not develop this point.
Thirdly, exclusion is a dynamic concept: “People are excluded not
just because they are currently without a job or income but because they
have little prospects for the future.” This aspect of the debate links both
with earlier social policy concerns about the extent to which poverty or
deprivation is transmitted across generations (Rutter and Madge, 1976),
and also with contemporary work on the dynamics of poverty, using
large-scale panel and longitudinal data (Hills, 1998; Jarvis and Jenkins,
1997a, 1997b).
However, in the current policy debate, the potential for the concept
of social exclusion to improve understanding and thereby assist policy is
being seriously weakened by two tendencies. First, as in the speeches
quoted above, the term ‘social exclusion’ is used interchangeably with the
discredited concept of the ‘underclass’. Secondly, the term is rapidly
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becoming a cliché to cover almost any kind of social ill. There are two key
strands to this discussion, which seem to me to be crucial.
Firstly, the notion of ‘socially excluded’ implies that there is a
majority population that is included. The key social cleavage is not
between social groups or economic classes, but between a comfortable
majority and an excluded minority. One effect of this analysis is to
minimise differences and conflict of interests in the majority population.
Focusing on social exclusion is politically attractive because it avoids the
difficulties associated with addressing inequalities and power relations in
the wider society.
Secondly, social exclusion is defined almost entirely in the current
debate by reference to exclusion from the labour market. To be socially
included is to work, and to work is to be socially included. Where this
leaves full-time (or even part-time) mothers is unclear, nor where it leaves
the millions of full-time carers undertaking billions of pounds of unpaid
work for others. Furthermore, even in relation to the formal labour
market, this seems a dangerous assumption. As Atkinson (1998) says:
“Unemployment may cause social exclusion, but employment does not
ensure social inclusion; whether or not it does so depends on the quality of
the work offered.”
This raises the question of what we understand by social inclusion
or social integration. The current vogue is that social inclusion has
something to do with community, with networks, with belonging.
Architectural fashion has come a long way from Le Corbusier’s ‘Unite
d’Habitation’ to today’s urban villages. Socially excluded areas don’t just
need jobs and better homes – apparently they need community centres,
self-help groups, voluntary organisations and community businesses. I
don’t quite follow the logic here, as these all seem to be things which
better off areas don’t have, or at least, don’t have that much of. I think
something important is being missed here.
In one regeneration scheme I studied, an entire 1960s council estate
was being demolished, and replaced with new, more traditional housing.
The existing tenants were being moved out to temporary accommodation
before moving back to the new housing. Residents were consulted in great
detail about the design or their new homes, and the immediate
environment. To the dismay of the well-trained and community-minded
architects who undertook the consultation, the tenants came up with
designs that were pretty near indistinguishable from the mass products of
the volume house-builders. When the architects pointed this out, they
were told “that’s the point. We want to be normal.” On the same scheme,
a budget allocation for a community centre has been placed into trust
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temporarily: the residents did not want a community centre. Normal
Britain (or “socially included” Britain) doesn’t have community centres –
people meet in pubs or in the street, at ASDA or Tesco.
Our recent research on employability confirms this pattern. In one
case, it was reported that “local people did not want another training
scheme. They wanted to get jobs”; while in another case study, a key
factor in the success of an innovative training scheme was the fact that
training was delivered in the headquarters building of a major IT firm.
Schemes are credible where they have a real link to the world of work.
The more general point is that it often seems to be assumed that
social order requires social cohesion. Is this in fact true? The American
sociologist Mary Baumgartner studied social interaction in a suburb of
New York City, chosen precisely because of its tranquillity and relative
social harmony (The Moral Order of the Suburb, 1988).
She looked at the handling of interpersonal tensions in everyday life
as these occur in families, neighborhoods, and public places. “The central
theme is that the moral order of the suburb is the product of a distinctive
social environment – one, moreover, which is becoming increasingly
prevalent in the modern world.”
Baumgartner’s conclusions are surprising to those who would lay
the blame for society’s ills on the collapse of civil society and the sense of
community:
“People in the suburbs live in a world characterised by
nonviolence and nonconfrontation in which civility prevails
and disturbances of the peace are uncommon. In this sense,
suburbia is a model of social order. The order is not born,
however, of conditions widely perceived to generate social
harmony. It does not arise from intimacy and connectedness,
but rather from some of the very things more often presumed
to bring about conflict and violence – transiency,
fragmentation, isolation, atomization, and indifference among
people. The suburbs lack social cohesion but they are free of
strife.”
(Baumgartner, 1988: 134)
Baumgartner calls this “moral minimalism”, and points out that it is
an unusual phenomenon in cross-cultural perspective – that is, few other
developed societies have it. She argues that it is the distinct patterns of
social stratification and social morphology in the suburbs that account for
it:
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“People in the suburbs move in and out of relationships
frequently and live their lives under conditions of privacy,
individuation, material independence, and freedom from
authority, all the while surrounded by a wide variety of
competing interests and associates.”
(Baumgartner, 1988: 128)
Moral minimalism entails not only indifference in the face of
potential social conflict, but a wider indifference to the fate of others: “If
people in such places cannot be bothered to take action against those who
offend them or to engage in conflicts, neither can they be bothered to help
those in need. Positive obligations to assist others are thus also minimal
where moral minimalism flourishes…If weak social ties generate weak
social control, they undermine strong patterns of mutual aid as well.”
(ibid., p.131).
There are important differences between U.S. and Britain both in
terms of urban structure, and also in terms of the degree of social, spatial
and ethnic segregation. But there are enough similarities to make
Baumgartner’s conclusions relevant to a consideration of Britain also.
If social cohesion is thus a chimera, where does this leave social
exclusion? The danger is that the emerging ideology of social inclusion
will lead to the imposition of modes of behaviour on the poor, which the
rest of society has rejected. This may well be acceptable to conservative
ideologists. But it is (I hope) unacceptable to a Labour or even New
Labour government.
4. The policy agenda
What is the link between urban regeneration and these issues? How does
place come in? Debate about the impact of the Millennium Dome and
other flagship projects often deteriorates quickly into ritualistic responses.
For those engaged in the competitive business of city marketing, and for
“urban boosters” generally, such mega-projects are straightforwardly
beneficial. As well as the direct effects of the new spending, tourism and
related spin-offs will generate jobs and economic activity that will trickle
down to the whole community. Flagship projects raise ‘competitiveness’
and establish global identity, two sine qua non for the modern age.
On the other hand, for many community activists and professional
pessimists, it is an article of faith that local needs will be ignored and
benefits will be concentrated in a small number of mainly non-local hands.
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“Whatever it is, it’s not for the likes of us” is a uniquely British phrase that
captures a particular attitude towards change and development.
Flagship projects and major public/private investments have a key
role to play in regeneration.  But the linkages to wider social and economic
benefits have to be carefully thought through and implemented, on a local
basis. There is no single blueprint for this. Too often, the assumption is
that a “training scheme” or some “community sponsorship” can be bolted
onto an investment project, and benefits will automatically flow into the
local economy.  They won’t. As countless examples have shown, jobs and
revenue can simply wash into and out of an area, leaving behind very
little. It doesn’t have to be like this, but making it different, takes time,
commitment, nerve and – as a result – money.
What we are also learning is that it is increasingly hard to draw the
line between ‘economic’ and ‘social’ aspects of regeneration. Over the past
twenty years policy shifted decisively towards seeking ‘hard’ economic
end-uses as policy outcomes for regeneration spending – such as
reductions in youth or long-term unemployment. But it is now becoming
clear that in obtaining such outcomes, “social” factors such as family
structure and individual self-esteem, and personal characteristics such as
punctuality, reliability and attitude are of equal or greater importance
than “economic” factors such as levels of inward investment, new
floorspace provided, or even formal training qualifications. In other
words, “social capital” is as important to economic development as
economic capital.
While there is no blueprint for successful regeneration policy, there
is much that can be done at each level of government:
♦ at local level, real partnerships involving long-term commitment by
a range of groups need to be made. Real partnerships involve
negotiation, innovation and risk-taking. Risk and the occasional
failure should be seen as indicators of good health, not as cause for
concern.
♦ at  regional or  metropolitan level, there need to be  strategies to which
local regeneration schemes can relate. In London, the Mayor,
working through the new London Development Agency and other
bodies should take a lead, and success or failure should be judged
on social as well as economic criteria.
♦ At national level, there needs to be: first, a move away from the
current obsession with quantitative performance indicators and the
development of broader measures which emphasise long term
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development and sustainability; secondly a commitment by the
Government to full employment and an expansionary macro-
economic regime. The limited gains that can be achieved from local
and regional regeneration, particularly in terms of employment, can
easily be swept away by the impact of deflationary economic policy.
What about the broader agenda on tackling social exclusion?
The first step the government should take is to link its actions on
social exclusion with an attack on poverty and inequality, and in doing so,
give the concept of social exclusion some credibility by separating it from
the sterile and stigmatising discourse on the “underclass”. My colleague
David Piachaud has estimated what the effect of current government
policies will be on the numbers in poverty over the next five years
(Piachaud, 1998).  He does this by examining the effects of demographic
and economic changes and forecasting “the potential impact of New
Labour policies for unemployment and welfare to work, for a minimum
wage and for social security. Policies announced up to and including the
Pre-Budget Statement of November 25th 1997 are analysed.”
He concludes that, while the New Deal and the minimum wage will
reduce poverty to some extent, these effects are far outweighed by the
implications of macro-economic policy for unemployment, and the effects
of failing to uprate social security benefits in line with the rise in national
output. Details are shown in Table 1:
Table 1: Forecast Effect on Numbers in Poverty 1997-2002
Ageing of population  Negligible
Growth in Lone-Parent Families -50,000 to +100,000
Level of Unemployment -400,000 to +800,000
New Deal and Welfare to Work  -150,000 to –400,000
Minimum Wage (£4 per hour)  -300,000
Social Security Price Indexation +1,500,000
Overall Change +350,000 to +1,950,000
Source: Piachaud (1998).
This analysis remains broadly true, even taking into account the
mildly redistributive effects of the March 1998 Budget. As Piachaud says,
“there is nothing inevitable about the growth of poverty”, and
governments have real policy choices to make here.
Secondly, government has put the labour market at the centre of its
programme for reducing social exclusion. Leaving aside for the moment,
the issue of whether work should be seen as the only or even the main
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route to social inclusion, it is vital that employability is raised for this part
of Government’s programme to work.
In a recent study commissioned by BT, Anne West and I looked at
the transition to work for both school-leavers and the unemployed
(Kleinman, West and Sparkes 1998). We reviewed the literature and
carried out case studies of employability-focused projects in England. We
found that though there were excellent schemes at local level, both school-
based and as part of wider regeneration projects, overall the national
picture was not encouraging.
♦ There are key weaknesses in the skills that school-leavers possess,
particularly ‘soft’ skills which are the key requirement for entry-
level jobs;
♦ The orientation of much of the training universe is towards
providing training outputs rather than getting people into jobs;
♦ There is a huge culture gap between the world of work and the
world of education.
 We concluded that raising the employability of target groups under
the New Deal will require business and government to act together both
in improving the skills and attributes of those currently on benefit, and in
maximising access to available entry-level jobs for those moving from
benefit. The former requires a combination of improvements in basic
numeracy, literacy and IT skills; personal and social skills; and job-related
skills. There are serious concerns about the ability of current standard
training schemes to deliver on these skills in a sustainable way to the
groups targeted by New Deal. The latter requires business to look in detail
at its recruitment procedures, and at the issue of stereotyping of applicants
by address, age, ethnicity or gender. Increasing employability in this way
will not be easy. It will require commitment, time and money on the part
of both government and business. Credibility is crucial, and can easily be
undermined by misguided attempts at short-term and quick-fix solutions.
Thirdly, we need policies for families and children.  Family
fragmentation is a major cause of poverty, inequality and social exclusion.
Its direct effects in terms of reduced income are compounded by the
longer term indirect effects via lowered educational achievement, low self-
esteem and low aspirations. This is a major area for policy intervention,
yet government is hamstrung by the continual trench warfare in the
culture battle between authoritarians and libertarians. Like the Battle of
the Somme, it is the foot soldiers – in this case children – who suffer the
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casualties.  We have to avoid the American scenario, described by Jencks
as follows:
“The ‘culture wars’ between liberals and conservatives have
probably left American children worse off than they would be
if either liberalism or conservatism were hegemonic. Because
such a large minority of Americans see single motherhood as a
legitimate and sometimes even the most prudent available
choice, our children are unusually likely to live in households
without a male breadwinner. Because an equally vociferous
(and somewhat larger) minority regard single motherhood as
a menace, the American government does very little to help
single parents. What really puts American children at risk thus
seems to be our much-vaunted diversity. What children in
every country need is consensus – any kind of consensus will
do – about how they should be supported. But consensus is
America’s scarcest commodity.”
(Jencks, 1997)
Children do better, by and large, by being cared for throughout
childhood by two parents who remain together, putting the needs of the
family as a unit in front of individual priorities for self-fulfilment. But
millions of children are growing up, and will continue to grow up in other
sorts of families. Policy should start from a position of aiming to
strengthen families, and to support children (not necessarily adults)
whatever their family circumstances. More important than a childcare
strategy is a children strategy. Mothers, including and especially lone
mothers, make tremendous and self-sacrificing investments in their
children. In 1995, researchers funded by the Joseph Rowntree foundation
interviewed a representative sample of British children and their families.
They found that:
“[a] very large percentage of mothers often or sometimes… go
without clothes and shoes, holidays and entertainment in
order to provide things for their children. One in twenty
mothers in Britain sometimes go without food to meet the
needs of their child. Lone mothers on Income Support are
more likely than other mothers to go without each item and to
go without more of the items. These mothers are 14 times
more likely to go without food than mothers in two-parent
families not on Income Support.”
(Middleton, Ashworth and Braithwaite, 1997)
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Huge amounts are spent on children in Britain, but too much is on
consumption and not enough on investment in children. Basic support
services like health visiting and family centres as well as specialist help
such as child therapy are cut back, while ever growing amounts of public
resources are spent on reactive services such as the juvenile justice system.
At the same time, various forms of quackery – such as the rapidly
expanding ‘educational software’ market and the unregulated counselling
industry - proliferate for the gullible middle class parent, swallowing
resources that could be more usefully deployed. The problem is
emphatically not one of resources: it is about the allocation of resources,
and resource allocation is what government is there for.
5. Conclusions
Tony Blair would like the Millennium Dome to be a symbol for Britain in
the 21st Century. The Dome is rapidly becoming a symbol for New Labour,
as a battleground between content and form, between the substance and
the hype.
In the politics of place and poverty, I agree broadly with
Christopher Jencks who wrote that he was in favour of cultural
conservatism, economic egalitarianism and the virtues of piecemeal
reform. Better social policy means less attention to generalities and more
attention to examples.
So far, however, New Labour has shown itself to be culturally
egalitarian and economically conservative. It seems impatient with
piecemeal reform, and too concerned with generalities, symbols and
marketing. The Government has a historic opportunity for radical reform
to the politics and economics of place and poverty. Like the Dome, it has
the focus of attention, and it has created an impressive superstructure.
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